Protesting Pulp: Argentina Battles Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay by Cote, Sean
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 17 | Number 4 Article 6
2011
Protesting Pulp: Argentina Battles Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay
Sean Cote
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Comment and Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sean Cote, Protesting Pulp: Argentina Battles Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 17 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 733 (2011)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol17/iss4/6
PROTESTING PULP: ARGENTINA BATTLES
PULP MILLS ON THE RIVER URUGUAY
Sean Cotd*
I. INTRODUCTIONARGENTINA and Uruguay have a long-standing relationship,
depending on one another for both economic and political stabil-
ity. Beginning in 2003, that relationship became much tenser.
When Empresa Nacional de Celulosas de Espatia ("ENCE") came to
Uruguay, the Spanish company began setting up plans to build a pulp mill
on the River Uruguay in a Uruguayan town called Fray Bentos.' The
immediate reaction in Argentina was one of worry and concern over the
environmental damage the pulp mill would cause to the river, an impor-
tant resource both economically and socially for the people of Argen-
tina.2 Following Argentina's concern, Uruguay agreed to conduct
environmental impact assessments for the mill.3 One of Argentina's con-
cerns was that a mill called "Orion" was already built adjacent to the
planned location of the new mill, "Botnia." 4 The potential for pollution
and damage to Argentina's fishing industry along the river was of major
concern for the Argentinean government and those who lived and
worked along the river. Argentina's worries were well-founded due to
the importance of the shared river border between the two countries.
In May 2006, Argentina filed a dispute to the International Court of
Justice ("IC" or the "Court") after Uruguay approved the building of
another mill, called the "Botnia" pulp mill.6 The application asserted that
Uruguay violated the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay ("Statute") that
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1. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, (Apr. 10, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf [hereinafter April
Judgment].
2. Id. at 21.
3. Id. at 21.
4. Id. at 23.
5. Michael K. Lee, The Uruguay Paper Pulp Mill Dispute: Highlighting the Growing
Importance of NGOs and Public Protest in the Enforcement of International Envi-
ronmental Law, 7 SUSTAINAuite Di v. L. & Po 'Y 71 (2006-2007).
6. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Application) (May 4, 2006), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/10779.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Argentina Application].
733
734 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 17
governs activity along the river bordering the two countries.7 Uruguay
continuously maintained that they followed the laws set forth in the 1975
Statute.8 Following the Argentina Application, Uruguay filed an action
for provisional measures, but the ICJ denied those measures, saving its
decision for a final ruling.9 The Court likely waited to render its decision
in hopes that Argentina and Uruguay would be able to resolve the dis-
pute between themselves without the Court's intervention, as prescribed
by the Statute.' 0
In April 2010, the International Court of Justice decided Argentina v.
Uruguay in favor of Uruguay.II Since 2007, environmentalists in Argen-
tina have blocked the main bridge that passes over the river, blocking
trade and tourism into Uruguay.12 Environmental activists claim that the
pulp mill is heavily polluting the river.' 3 The ICJ decided in favor of
Uruguay, but little has been done to remove the protestors from the
bridge.14 The bridge is now open, but both countries need to take further
measures toward ensuring a peaceful relationship.
The countries continue to have a relationship plagued by friction over
the pulp mill.' 5 To date, no evidence has shown that the pulp mill has
polluted the River Uruguay, yet environmentalists continue to protest
along the bridge.16 This is a prime example of how the international legal
system has failed to help the two countries. While legitimizing the paper
mill was beneficial to Uruguay, the ICJ opinion did very little to alleviate
the tension between the two countries. In general, international courts
are plagued by problems such as this one, where one of the parties ref-
uses to follow a decision from an international court.' 7
This comment will explore the legal options available to Argentina and
Uruguay to alleviate the friction and will discuss what affect the ICJ opin-
ion will have on the situation, if any. As it currently stands between the
two countries, the friction still exists, even after the ICJ issued its opin-
7. Id. at 9; Statute of the River Uruguay, Uru.-Arg., Feb. 26, 1975, 1295 U.N.T.S. 340
[hereinafter 1975 Statute].
8. See Argentina Application, supra note 6, at 9.
9. See April Judgment, supra note 1, at 10.
10. See 1975 Statute, supra note 7, at 346 (noting that the process of disputes between
parties similarly situated prefers negotiation before judicial intervention).
11. See April Judgment, supra note 1, at 80.
12. Maria Alejandra Del-Cerro, Paper Battle on the River Uruguay: The International
Dispute Surrounding the Construction of Pulp Mills, 20 GEO. INT'L ENvrL. L. REV.
161 (2007-2008).
13. Id.
14. See Argentina, Uruguay mull removing pickets from bridge, UPI (June 4,2010,5:25
PM), http://www.upi.com/TopNews/Special/2010/06/04/Argentina-Uruguay-mull-
removing-pickets-from-bridge/UPI-74901275686748 [hereinafter UPI Article].
15. See id. (discussing picketing on the bridge that has occurred from 2006 until 2010
and that his has yet to be resolved).
16. See id.
17. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Enforcing the Avena Decision in U.S. Courts, 30
HARV. J.L. & PuB. Pot'y 199, 120 (2006) (advocating that courts should not give
effect to any decision of the ICJ).
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ion."s Uruguay must take necessary steps to please Argentina, and both
countries must ensure that conflict is kept at bay. As neighboring coun-
tries, their economies are interdependent and a peaceful relationship is
imperative. This paper will begin with an outline of the 1975 Statute and
continue by analyzing each of the decisions made by the ICJ that
culminated in the final April Judgment. The paper will then explore what
has, or has not, happened since the April Judgment, what remedies each
country should seek to attempt to enforce the final ruling by the ICJ, and
how to avoid conflicts going forward.
II. STATUTE OF THE RIVER URUGUAY
The River Uruguay has long been a point of contention between the
countries that surround the river.' 9 From the colonial period, when Spain
and Portugal had control of the surrounding territory, to modern day Ar-
gentina and Uruguay, the river has played an integral role in the relation-
ship between the relevant parties. 2 0 The struggle for a formalized
agreement between Argentina and Uruguay lasted many decades.2' Ne-
gotiations began in 1910 with an agreement "formalizing the customary
practice," but a final treaty was not agreed upon until 1975.22 The Statute
highlights a point between the two countries when relations were at a
high point and both countries were able to recognize that it would be
mutually beneficial to have peaceful relations regarding the River
Uruguay.
A. PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE
The Statute of the River Uruguay was a culmination of many years of
negotiations between Argentina and Uruguay.23 The parties agreed to
sign the treaty in order to establish the necessary means for both coun-
tries to amicably utilize the resources of the river and ensure that neither
party exploited the river to the detriment of the other country. 24 The
Statute resolves the long-fought jurisdictional boundaries between the
two countries by establishing that no concrete boundaries would exist.2 5
The Statute also establishes the procedures and customs for navigating
the river, safety measures, recovering vessels, and protecting the sur-
rounding lands through environmental policies.26
One of the key provisions of the 1975 Statute sets up the procedure for
18. See UPI Article, supra note 14.
19. Del-Cerro, supra note 12, at 169.
20. See Id.
21. Id.
22. Del-Cerro, supra note 12, at 170.
23. See Lilian Del Castillo LaBorde, Legal Regime of the Rio de la Plata, 36 NAr.
Riesouiacs J. 251, 269-71 (1996) (discussing the lengthy negotiations period be-
tween Uruguay and Argentina leading up to the passage of the statute).
24. 1975 Statute, supra note 7, at 340.
25. Del-Cerro, supra note 12, at 170.
26. See generally, 1975 Statute, supra note 7.
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dealing with disputes.2 7 A commission was set up to deal with studies and
disputes regarding the river.2 8 When either country decides to build or
construct along the river, the plans must be submitted to the Commission
for study and approval. 2 9 The Commission is to determine, within thirty
days, "whether the plan might cause significant damage to the other
[plarty." 30 If the Commission finds that there may be damage, the party
planning to build on the river must notify the other party in detail of the
plans.3 1 The notified party then has 180 days to respond to the plans and
raise objections. 3 2 If no objections are raised, then the party may carry
out the work as planned.3 3 If the notified party raises objections, the
Statute recommends direct negotiations; but, if direct negotiations do not
resolve the matter, then either party may file with the ICJ.3 4 In the case
before us, both countries would have greatly benefited had they taken
proper measures to directly resolve the dispute instead of hastily filing
the dispute with the ICJ.
The Commission chartered by the 1975 Statute is made up of an equal
number of representatives from Argentina and Uruguay, and is head-
quartered along the river in Uruguay.35 The Commission has broad pow-
ers for directing and implementing activity along and in the river.36 The
Commission's duties include monitoring the activities discussed above, as
well as regulating fishing and other economic activities along the river. 37
The Commission is also charged with regulating and maintaining the eco-
logical balance of the river, including pollution in the river.38
The Statute's purpose is clear, and it does a good job of explaining the
procedures for dealing with environmental issues involving the river; but,
the countries do not seem to agree on how exactly the provisions of the
1975 Statute are to be implemented. The Statute was clearly drafted at a
time when the countries were able to see that a peaceful relationship was
important. Both countries need to remember why they drafted the 1975
Statute in the first place. Had they done so from the outset, perhaps they
would have been able to resolve the dispute before it escalated into such
a contentious battle.
B. POLLUTION
Chapter X of the 1975 Statute describes the pollution provisions to be
27. See 1975 Statute, supra note 7, at 340.
28. Id. at 345.





34. Id. at 347.
35. Id. at 346.
36. See id.
37. Del-Cerro, supra note 12, at 170.
38. Id.
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followed by Argentina and Uruguay. 39 Article 40 defines pollution as
"the direct or indirect introduction by man into the aquatic environment
of substances or energy which have harmful effects." 40 Article 56 subse-
quently charges the Commission with protecting the river's environment
by creating rules and guidelines to be followed by both countries.4 1 The
Statute makes each party liable to the other for damages inflicted as a
result of pollution from each country's own territory.42 Argentina prop-
erly recognized that the building of pulp mills along the River Uruguay
might violate this chapter of the 1975 Statute.
Along with the reconciliation procedures discussed above, the pollu-
tion measures of the Statute create a concrete means for each country to
ensure that pollution of the River Uruguay is minimal and that each
country is responsible for the pollution that it creates. 43 The Commission
is charged with creating rules and enforcing those rules upon each coun-
try.44 When one country breaks the rules, the Statute suggests that the
parties "attempt to [re]solve the issue through direct negotiations. If di-
rect negotiations fail, the statute directs either party to file a case with the
ICJ."45 Once submitted to the ICJ, the matter is out of the hands of the
Commission and transferred into the jurisdiction of the ICJ.4 6
Both countries suffered from bringing this matter before the ICJ. Dur-
ing the five years that it took to resolve the matter, trade and tourism
between the countries were severely damaged, impacting the economies
of both countries.47 Had both countries taken a proactive and concilia-
tory attitude toward the situation, this could have been avoided. Because
they did not, a prolonged battle in the ICJ ensued. An introduction to
the ICJ is necessary to understand how and why the dispute was brought
before them.
III. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The ICJ replaced the League of Nations' Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice in 1945.48 The Court had a new governing statute, new
judges, and new members.49 The ICJ is the judicial body for the United
Nations ("UN") and was set up by the UN Charter.50 It is located prima-
rily in the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands. 5' The Court was set




43. Del-Cerro, supra note 12, at 172.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See 1975 Statute, supra note 7, at 347.
47. Id.
48. Grant Gilmore, The International Court of Justice, 55 YA . L.J. 1049, 1049 (1946).
49. Id.
50. Rules of Court, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. Art. 1, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
documents/index.php?pl =4&p2=2&p3=0 [hereinafter Statute of Court].
51. Id. art. 22.
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up to serve as a judicial body for disputes between UN member states
and to issue advisory opinions for questions of law submitted by
members. 52
A. COMPOSITION
The ICJ is composed of fifteen judges, of which no two may be from
the same state, that are elected by the UN General Assembly for nine
year terms. 53 The method for electing judges is laid out in the statute of
the ICJ.5 4 The judges are to be of varying nationalities and independent
from their home countries.55 When giving their opinions, they write both
joint opinions and sometimes their own separate opinions. 56 Decisions of
the ICJ are made by a majority of the judges.57 The same goes for advi-
sory opinions submitted to the court.58 The Court decides relatively few
cases, mostly because its purpose is to be an arbiter of last resort.59 The
ICJ properly recognized from the outset that the dispute between Argen-
tina and Uruguay should be dealt with directly; but, Argentina and Uru-
guay refused to work to resolve it without the involvement of the ICJ.6 0
B. JURISDICrION
Under the United Nations Charter, the states of the United Nations
may be parties to suit in the ICJ.6 1 Additionally, under the Charter, only
states may bring suit against other states. 62 Other non-UN states may
also place themselves in the jurisdiction of the court by placing them-
selves under the Court's statute.63 To further explore the Court's jurisdic-
tion, one must understand the two types of opinions the court gives:
contentious and advisory."
Contentious opinions are those that seek to settle a dispute between
two member states.65 The Court's statute provides that parties may be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Court if they consent. 66 This means that
each party to the case must agree to submit to the ruling of the Court. 67
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 3, 13.
54. See id.
55. Id. art. 2.
56. Brian Spiegel, River of Discontent: Argentina and Uruguay Before the International
Court of Justice, 14 L. & Bus. Riv. AM. 797, 800 (2008).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See generally, International Court of Justice, List of Cases Referred to the Court
since 1964, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=2 (last visited Nov. 9,
2011).
60. See Del-Cerro, supra note 12, at 173.
61. Statute of Court, supra note 50, art. 34.
62. Id. art 35.
63. Id.
64. Spiegel, supra note 56, at 800.
65. Id. at 799.
66. Statute of Court, supra note 50, art. 35.
67. Id.
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There are four methods that the Court can use to exercise jurisdiction in
contentious cases. 68 Parties may 1) refer the cases to the Court, but both
parties must agree to submit the case, 2) the Court can exercise jurisdic-
tion in areas where there is a treaty or agreement already in force be-
tween the countries, 3) the states may make "optional clause
declarations," subjecting themselves to the Court's jurisdiction in certain
types of cases, and 4) the Court has jurisdiction for cases that arise under
the Court's statute. 69 Most of the Court's decisions are made in conten-
tious cases.
Concerning advisory opinions, the Court has jurisdiction to hear cases
from states, other state-related entities, and UN agencies. 70 The primary
purpose of the advisory opinions is to help UN agencies decide potential
issues that may arise under their directives.7 ' Although the opinions do
not carry the weight of adversarial opinions as far as states are concerned,
they are binding because the ICJ is the principle judicial body of the
UN. 7 2 This makes the opinions binding to the UN agencies.73
Once the ICJ decides a case, it will generally issue a majority opinion,
allowing individual justices to write their own opinions of concurrence or
dissent.74 There is no appeal allowed, but parties may ask the court to
clarify the rulings after the opinion is issued.75
Because decisions of the ICJ can take years, the Court allows certain
measures to prevent immediate harm to the parties involved.76 A state
may file for provisional measures so that the Court may decide certain
measures to take effect immediately.77 The Court's authority in imple-
menting provisional measures is limited only to measures that require ur-
gent attention and will cause irreparable harm.78 In Argentina and
Uruguay's case, Argentina initially filed for provisional measures, fol-
lowed later by an application from Uruguay.79 The back and forth nature
of the filings between Argentina and Uruguay highlights just how conten-
tious the case became once the countries refused to negotiate directly
with one another.
The actions taken by the neighboring countries in the ICJ are reminis-
cent of a typical, highly contentious case brought about in a U.S. court.
One side files the initial case with the court, and the other side replies
with provisional measures. Argentina and Uruguay went back and forth
68. Spiegel, supra note 56, at 800.
69. Id.
70. Statute of Court, supra note 50, art. 65.
71. Id.
72. Id. art. 66.
73. Id. art. 68.
74. Id. art. 55.
75. Id.
76. Spiegel, supra note 56, at 800.
77. Id.
78. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Order, (July 13, 2006), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl=4&p2= 2 &p3 =0 [hereinafter July
Order].
79. Spiegel, supra note 56, at 803, 817.
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in an adversarial way until the ICJ finally rendered a decision. Both
countries should have recognized how damaging a case like this would be
for their relationship. When the tensions began to rise, both states should
have begun dealing directly with the issue without involving the ICJ. Had
they done so, the issue could have been resolved earlier. The years and
years of tension between Argentina and Uruguay caused damage to their
relationship that will likely take years to repair.
IV. ARGENTINA'S APPLICATION TO THE ICJ
On May 4, 2006, Argentina filed an application instituting proceedings
in the ICJ against Uruguay, citing violations by Uruguay under the 1975
Statute of the River Uruguay.s0 Argentina cited both procedural and
substantive violations of the 1975 Statute.8' Various European compa-
nies planned to build two mills on the River Uruguay, yet Argentina con-
tinuously claimed that these mills "jeopardized conservation of the
environment of the river and areas affected by it."82
A. THE CMB (ENCE) PROJECT
The Spanish company Celulosas de M'BopicuA S.A. (CMB) 83 planned
to build the first pulp mill in the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos.84 The
Commission, set up by the 1975 Statute (CARU), 85 attended a public
meeting and investigated the environmental impact of the proposed pulp
mill. 8 6 In October 2003, Uruguay claimed that CARU issued an initial
environmental approval of the construction of the CMB mill.87 The pres-
ident of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner, denied this, stating that he made it
clear that no authorization would be given by CARU until Argentina's
environmental concerns over the mill were addressed.88 This is one area
of dispute that the ICJ considered in its final opinion.8 9
In a meeting on May 15, 2004, the CARU Subcommittee on Water
Quality and Pollution Control created a plan for monitoring the area
around the pulp mills for possible pollution and environmental damage to
the river.90 CMB stopped construction on their mill in November 2005.91
They officially announced their intention not to build the mill in Septem-
ber 2006.92 Because the mill was never built, it fell off the radar of con-
80. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Press Release, (2007/2), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/14037.pdf [hereinafter Press Release].
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 19.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 21.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 22.
90. Id. at 21.




Uruguay should have recognized, at this point, that their economy
stood to suffer from their unwillingness to settle directly with Argentina.
Uruguay could have prevented the loss of CMB's business by working
with Argentina to figure out a way to resolve the dispute without having
to turn to the ICJ. With Argentina's initial worry about the mills, Uru-
guay should have taken proper measures to ensure Argentina was in-
volved in the decision-making process with respect to the River. It is in
Uruguay's best interest, as a neighboring country, to include Argentina
on issues that have a high possibility of affecting them. By doing so, Uru-
guay can prevent detrimental losses to business, such as the loss of busi-
ness investment from CMB that they endured in this case.
B. THE ORION (BOTNIA) MILL
The second mill in the dispute was the "Orion" mill. A Uruguayan
company, chartered for the purpose of being run by the Finnish company
Metsa-Botnia AB, built the mill which has been functioning and opera-
tional since November 9, 2007.93 Argentina immediately expressed out-
rage over what it saw as Uruguay's lack of concern for the environmental
impact of the mills. 9 4 Uruguay, on the other hand, maintained that it
followed the 1975 Statute in getting the approval for the mills.9 5 With the
countries in clear disagreement about whether there was pollution, ac-
tions needed to be taken to clarify whether pollution of the River Uru-
guay resulting from operations of the pulp mill occurred.
In July 2005, Uruguay also authorized Botnia to build a port adjacent
to their mill on the river.96 Because the port was also on the river, the
company submitted the authorization to CARU and began work building
the mills.97 Outraged, Argentina asked Uruguay to halt construction on
the mills until they could come to an agreement over the environmental
issues.98 This is when CMB halted their construction, and subsequently
decided not to build their mills.99 Botnia, on the other hand, halted con-
struction for only ten days.100 This concerned Argentina because the Na-
tional Directorate for the Environment of the Uruguayan Government
(DINAMA), in its initial study of the plans presented by the pulp mill
companies, found that the plans would almost certainly result in river pol-
lution. 10' With a dispute about what the Commission found regarding
pollution of the river, Uruguay should have halted construction and clari-
93. Id.
94. Spiegel, supra note 56, at 803.
95. Id.
96. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 23.
97. Id.
98. Spiegel, supra note 56, at 803.
99. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 23.
100. Id.
101. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Application) (May 4, 2006), available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/10779.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
Application].
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fied with its neighboring country whether pollution would actually result
from the operation of the mill.
C. THE ALLEGED PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS
The Application filed by Argentina concerns an alleged breach of both
procedural and substantive provisions in the 1975 Statute.102 The ICJ ex-
ercised jurisdiction under the treaty enforcement power previously dis-
cussed.103 The allegations stated that Uruguay breached procedures laid
out in the 1975 Statute under Articles 7 through 12 with regard to the
CMB and Botnia mills in Fray Bentos, along the River Uruguay.104
In the allegations, Argentina took the view that the "procedural obliga-
tions were intrinsically linked to the substantive obligations laid down by
the 1975 Statute." 05 They also stated that the CARU played a central
role in these procedural duties that Uruguay violated.106 Argentina
claimed that Uruguay failed to refer the plans of the pulp mills immedi-
ately to CARU. 07 Uruguay also did not directly notify Argentina of its
plans to approve the CMB and Botnia pulp mills, which Argentina
claimed was a violation of Article 7 of the 1975 Statute. 108 By not notify-
ing CARU and Argentina of its plans to build the mills, Argentina
claimed Uruguay "breached all of its obligations under the terms of Arti-
cles 7 to 12 of the 1975 Statute."109 The 1975 Statute also states that the
countries are to attempt to reconcile any dispute directly before resorting
to the ICJ.110 Argentina, to its detriment, seems to have overlooked this
important part of the 1975 Statute.
D. THE ALLEGED SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATIONS
In addition to procedural violations, Argentina alleged multiple sub-
stantive violations of the 1975 Statute by authorizing the construction and
operation of the Botnia mill. Argentina alleged breach under Articles 1,
27, 35, 36, and 41(a) of the 1975 statute."' Uruguay rejected these alle-
gations, contending that the 1975 Statute authorizes the countries to util-
ize the waters of the river for domestic, sanitary, industrial, and
agricultural purposes.112
Argentina alleged that Uruguay breached the substantive provisions of
the 1975 Statute in four different areas.1'3 They claimed that Uruguay
breached Article 1 of the 1975 Statute's obligation to contribute to the
102. Id. at 22.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Id. at 32.
105. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 30.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 1975 Statute, supra note 7, at art. 60.
111. Application, supra note 101, at 44.
112. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 52.
113. Application, supra note 101, at 44.
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optimum and rational utilization of the river by "failing to co-ordinate
with Argentina on measures necessary to avoid ecological change, and by
failing to take the measures necessary to prevent pollution."1 4 Argen-
tina also claimed that all pre-existing uses of the river, including recrea-
tional uses, must be taken into account when considering changes to be
made. 1 5
The second alleged substantive breach claimed that Uruguay breached
its obligation to ensure that the management of the soil and woodland did
not impair the regime of the river or the quality of its waters under Arti-
cle 35 of the 1975 Statute.1 16 Argentina claimed that Uruguay's major
eucalyptus planting efforts along the river to provide raw materials for
the pulp mills greatly impacted the soil, woodlands, and quality of the
river's water." 7 This claim seems fairly weak as it centers upon impact of
soil in Uruguay and not the water. If Argentina could have shown that
the soil affected the water, this claim would have been stronger.
The third substantive allegation claims that Uruguay violated its obliga-
tion to co-ordinate measures to avoid changes in the ecological balance of
the river and surrounding land under Article 36 of the 1975 Statute." 8
Argentina claims that Uruguay did not coordinate with CARU to take
the necessary precautions to avoid altering the ecological balance in the
river.' 19 This is a clear violation of the 1975 Statute, so long as Argentina
could substantiate it with a reasonable amount of proof.
Finally, Argentina claimed that the Botnia mill discharged certain
materials and nutrients into the river that constituted pollution under in-
ternational environmental standards. 120 This was covered under Article
41(a) of the 1975 Statute.121 Argentina additionally contended that all of
the substantive violations were so closely related to the procedural viola-
tions that if any procedure was violated, then the substantive provisions
must have also been violated as well.122 Their logic is somewhat convo-
luted, so it is tough to see why a procedural violation necessarily meant
that a substantive provision had been violated.
Argentina was right to question the mills. Uruguay was keeping them
out of the picture during the planning and development stages of the
mills along the River. Uruguay has its own sovereignty when it comes to
allowing companies to incorporate in its territory, but by the existence of
the 1975 Statute alone, Uruguay has recognized that activity along the
river inherently affects Argentina as well. Uruguay should have made
efforts to comply with the 1975 Statute and kept Argentina involved in
114. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 52.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 54.
117. Id.
118. Application, supra note 101, at 54.
119. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 54.
120. Id.
121. 1975 Statute, supra note 7, art. 41(a).
122. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 31.
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the process of assessing the environmental impact the mills would have
on the river.
V. ARGENTINA FILES PROVISIONAL MEASURES
Shortly after it filed the application in the ICJ, Argentina requested
that the court grant certain provisional measures.123 With the Court's fi-
nal decision on the application likely to take up to three years, Argentina
decided that provisional measures were necessary to permit the ICJ to
"preserve the rights of the parties pending final decision on the merits of
[the] case."' 24 These provisional measures require a showing of irrepara-
ble prejudice to the disputed rights. 1 2 5 Urgency is also required for the
granting of provisional measures.12 6 With these provisional measures,
Argentina wanted to halt all progress on the paper mills, including plan-
ning and construction.127 If it were really worried about the urgency of
the case, Argentina should have made more of an effort to resolve the
dispute with Uruguay directly.
In the provisional measures, Argentina claimed that Uruguay was lia-
ble for all damages created by the mill, including economic damages.128
One of Argentina's major concerns was how the mills would affect tour-
ism in Argentina.12 9 Uruguay strongly disagreed with Argentina's asser-
tion that the 1975 Statute covered economic damages.13 0 Uruguay
believed that the Statute only covered the damages that it explicitly cov-
ered, specifically, pollution and other ecological damages done to the
river area. A reading of the 1975 Statute does not make this issue clear;
but, one can easily recognize how difficult the calculation of economic
damages such as the "loss of tourism" would be.
Argentina also maintained that under the 1975 Statute a construction
project may only proceed if agreed upon by both parties and, if not, the
party implementing the project must not proceed until a decision is ren-
dered by the ICJ.13 ' By the time the provisional measures were filed,
construction of the mills had already begun, and Argentina filed the pro-
visional measures to halt construction quickly, at least until environmen-
tal studies could be finished and discussed and proper measures could be
taken.132 Argentina also took issue with the location of the mills.' 3 3
Argentina's request for provisional measures also claimed procedural
123. Pieter Bekker, Introductory Note to Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.
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violations. 134 Similar to the allegations in their application to the ICJ,
Argentina claimed that construction of the mills should have never begun
because there was no agreement.' 3 5 It claimed that the construction had
to be ended immediately; otherwise the ecology of the river was in imme-
diate danger of irreparable harm. 136 Argentina also said that it had a
right to at least be notified when construction of the mills began, but that
Uruguay made no such notification. 3 7
Uruguay responded to the provisional measures by claiming that it had
a sovereign right to economic development on its own soil and reiterated
that the mills would be some of the most technologically advanced in the
world.138 "Uruguay further claimed that it had complied in good faith
with the notification provisions of the 1975 Statute and that the foreign
ministers of the two countries agreed in March 2004 that the project
could go forward subject to joint monitoring." 13 9 Uruguay believed that
it took all the measures necessary to comply with the 1975 Statute.
On July 13, 2006, the ICJ released an Order deciding the provisional
measures requested by Argentina.140 In a 14-1 vote, the court rejected
the measures requested.141 The court recognized that they had jurisdic-
tion over the matter,142 but they found that the planning and construction
of the mills did not represent an "imminent threat of irreparable damage
to the aquatic environment of the River Uruguay . . . ."143 The court did
recognize that the pulp mills were not yet operational, and therefore the
court could find harm in a later decision if evidence of damage were to
present itself once the mills were in operation.144 The ICJ also suggested
that both parties should try to work this problem out directly, so as to
avoid a highly charged political dispute. 145 Shortly after the Court's July
Order, the CMB mill was permanently halted at the discretion of
CMB.146
The ICJ recognized the need for the countries to resolve the problem
themselves from the outset. It was vital that the two countries carry on a
peaceful relationship. It appears that the ICJ was hoping that the coun-
tries would be able to work the problem out directly before the Court
would have to decide the issue.
134. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. V. Ur.), Order, (July 13, 2006), 1$ 5-6,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/ docket/files/135/11235.pdf [hereinafter July
Order].
135. Id. $ 11.
136. Id. J 17.
137. Id. 34.
138. Bekker, supra note 123, at 311.
139. Id.
140. July Order, supra note 134.
141. Id. 9 87.
142. Id., 87.
143. Id. 1 73.
144. Bekker, supra note 123, at 312.
145. Id.
146. April Judgment, supra note 1, 9 36.
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VI. URUGUAY RESPONDS TO ARGENTINA'S PROTESTS
On November 20, 2006, Argentinean citizens blocked the Fray Bentos
bridge in protest, effectively severing transportation between Argentina
and Uruguay. 1 4 7 On November 29, 2006, Uruguay filed a request for pro-
visional measures with the ICJ.14 8 Uruguay promptly filed the request
for provisional measures so that the court could stop protestors from
blocking the bridge between the two States. 1 4 9 This was important be-
cause the Fray Bentos bridge "forms a major artery for Uruguayan ex-
ports to Argentina and for tourist traffic into Uruguay."15 0
In December 2006, hearings were held and Uruguay claimed that the
blockades prevented them from continuing construction of the pulp
mills-the construction that the July Order from the ICJ stated they had
a right to continue.15 1 Uruguay asserted that the blockades were aimed
specifically at impeding the construction of the mills and preventing them
from ever coming into operation.152 Argentina denied having en-
couraged the roadblocks, which were set up by civic protestors, and
claimed that no delay was done to the construction of the Botnia pulp
mill or trade and tourism between the two countries. 53
On January 23, 2007, the ICJ issued an Order rejecting the provisional
measures requested by Uruguay in a 14-1 decision. 154 The ICJ deter-
mined that Uruguay had failed to establish the urgency necessary for pro-
visional measures to be granted: irreparable harm to the rights claimed in
the case.1 55 The Court determined that there was no immediate harm to
Uruguay's right to proceed with construction and operation of the Botnia
mill.156 According to the Court, the roadblocks did not present a risk of
harm that rose to the level required to grant the provisional measures.157
There was not enough evidence that the roadblocks even affected the
construction of the Botnia mill at all.' 58 The Court even recognized that
since the roadblocks and protests had been put in place, there had been
significant progress in the building of the Botnia pulp mill.' 59 The evi-
dence was simply too sparse for the Court to take such a drastic measure
147. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Order, (Jan. 23, 2007), 9$ 6-8
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/13615.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2011) [hereinafter January Order]; see also Bekker, supra note 123, at 312.
148. January Order, supra note 147, 9 6.
149. Id. 1 7.
150. Andrea Moretti, Uruguay Plays Hardball Politics Against Argentinas's Kirchner,
COHA (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.coha.org/uruguay-plays-hardball-politics-
against-argentina% E2%80% 99s-kirchner/.
151. January Order, supra note 147, 1 35.
152. Bekker, supra note 123, at 312.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. January Order, supra note 147, 1 50.
156. Id. 91 42.
157. Bekker, supra note 123, at 312.
158. See January Order, supra note 147, 1 42-43, 50.
159. Id. 9 40.
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as to force protestors in Argentina to stop protesting. 160 This was likely a
decision based on policy-it was an area in which the Court did not want
to get involved before it could decide its final ruling on the matter.
Without the risk of imminent prejudice, the Court declined to force
Argentina to remove the roadblocks on the Fray Bentos bridge and
would not grant Uruguay's wishes to force Argentina to abstain from tak-
ing any actions that might frustrate settlement efforts.161 Beyond public
policy reasons for the decision, the evidence was not convincing enough
to show that imminent harm would be caused to Uruguay.162 The Court
did, however, reiterate that both sides should try to prevent any actions
that would hinder the Court's final settlement of the dispute.163 The
court would not go so far as to force either side to behave in a certain
manner, they instead gave more advisory-like suggestions to both
sides.164
Since the ICJ's decision on Uruguay's request for provisional mea-
sures, the Court has made a final decision on the matter.'65 The CMB
mill was restarted at a different location, south of Fray Bentos.' 66 The
Botnia mill was completed in November of 2007 and produced its first
load of pulp for the production of paper.167 Argentinean citizens met the
event with large protests on the Fray Bentos bridge.168
VII. THE ICJ DELIVERS ITS FINAL OPINION
Four years after Argentina filed the initial application to the ICJ, the
court rendered its final Order in the matter.169 The ICJ properly held
that Uruguay did violate procedural provisions of the 1975 Statute, but
did not violate any substantive provisions.170 The Court held that the
breach of Articles 7 to 12 of the Statute were violated by Uruguay, but no
damage had occurred as a result of the breach; therefore, declaration of
the breach was enough of a remedy to satisfy the issue.' 71 The Court held
that Uruguay did not breach the substantive obligations under Articles
35, 36, and 41 of the 1975 Statute as was alleged by Argentina.172 They
rejected the idea that a breach of a procedural provision automatically
meant that a substantive provision was also breached. 73
160. Id., $ 43
161. Bekker, supra note 123, at 312.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 313 n.9.
165. See April Judgment, supra note 1, at 1.
166. Spiegel, supra note 56, at 822.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. April Judgment, supra note 1, at 1.
170. Id. 1 282.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. $ 78.
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A. THE ICJ's RULING ON THE PROCEDURAL BREACHES
To examine whether Uruguay breached procedural obligations of the
1975 Statute, the ICJ first looked to the nature and role of the CARU in
the matter.174 The Court determined that due to the scale and diversity
of the functions assigned to the commission, both Argentina and Uruguay
"intended to make that international organization a central component in
the fulfillment of their obligations to co-operate as laid down by the 1975
Statute."s75 The ICJ then turned to Uruguay's obligation to inform the
CARU of its plans to build the mills.1 7 6 The Court concluded that by
failing to inform CARU of the planned pulp mills before they granted the
environmental authorizations to build the pulp mills and the port at the
Botnia mill, Uruguay failed to comply with Article 7 of the 1975 Stat-
ute.' 7 7 Finally, the Court addressed Uruguay's obligation to notify Ar-
gentina directly of its plans to build the mills.'7 8
The Court observed that the notification to Argentina of the environ-
mental assessments did not take place through CARU and were related
to Argentina after the authorizations were already given for both mills.17 9
Uruguay claimed that they went about it this way because of their own
laws, but the rule of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in
Article 27, is that failure to perform in accordance with a treaty cannot be
justified by citing internal laws.180 For these reasons, the Court found
that Uruguay failed to comply with Article 7 of the 1975 Statute by not
informing Argentina before issuing the initial environmental authoriza-
tions for the pulp mills. 181
The Court then turned to the question of whether the countries agreed
to deviate from the 1975 Statute in the agreement of their ministers in
March of 2004.182 The Court evaluated the purpose of the March 2004
negotiations and determined that if the purpose of the negotiations was
to exempt Uruguay from the procedural obligations of the 1975 Statute,
then Uruguay would be exempted so long as it followed the measures laid
forth in the "understanding." 183 But, the Court determined that Uruguay
did not follow the measures in the "understanding" and therefore was not
exempted from the procedural provisions of the 1975 Statute.184 By not
notifying Argentina, Uruguay violated a procedural provision of the 1975
Statute as it was to be understood by both parties.






180. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
181. April Judgment, supra note 1, 122.




After properly establishing that Uruguay breached its procedural du-
ties to inform, notify, and negotiate on the matters above concerning the
mills on the River Uruguay, the Court then turned to the issue of the
substantive obligations of Uruguay under the 1975 Statute, addressing
whether or not they were breached.18 5
B. RULING ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
In addressing the alleged breach of substantive provisions of the 1975
Statute, the ICJ first examined the obligation to contribute to the opti-
mum and rational utilization of the river under Article 1.186 The Court
observed that Uruguay fulfilled its duty of doing so because of the eco-
nomic benefits that Uruguay will obtain from the pulp mills. 187 The
Court also established that the optimum and rational utilization of the
river did not necessarily mean it had to apply to both sides. 88 The Court
addressed Article 27 of the 1975 Statute, stating that it "embodies this
interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization of a
shared resource and the balance between economic development and
environmental protection that is the essence of sustainable
development." 89
The Court next moved to the alleged breach of Article 35 of the 1975
Statute.190 Part of the Article provides that each country has an obliga-
tion to ensure that the management of the soil and woodland does not
impair the regime of the river or the quality of its waters.19' The Court
held that Argentina did not provide enough evidence to support the con-
tention that the planting of trees for the mill was damaging to the soil or
woodlands.' 9 2 The Court said that the change in soil had to have an ef-
fect on the quality of the water under Article 35 and Argentina did not
show any evidence at all concerning the effect the planting of the euca-
lyptus trees would have on the water.193 Because the evidence was lack-
ing, the Court properly determined that this Article was not breached by
Uruguay.
The Court found for Uruguay concerning Argentina's allegations that
Uruguay failed to co-ordinate measures to avoid changes in the ecologi-
cal balance under Article 36 of the 1975 Statute.' 94 Argentina asserted
that the discharges from the Botnia mill altered the ecological balance of
the river. The Court found that Uruguay had not failed to undertake the
proper co-ordination measures under the Statute, and therefore breach
185. Id. 159.
186. Id. 170.
187. See generally id. $$ 172-77.
188. Id.
189. Id. $ 177.
190. Id. ff 178-79.
191. 1975 Statute, supra note 7, art. 35.
192. April Judgment, supra note 1, 1 180.
193. Id.
194. See 1975 Statute, supra note 7, art. 36; April Judgment, supra note 1, 9 180.
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could not be established.195
After addressing the first three substantive allegations, the Court then
moved on to a thorough inquiry into Uruguay's obligation to prevent pol-
lution and observe the aquatic environment under Article 41 of the 1975
Statute.196 Argentina claimed that Uruguay polluted the river by al-
lowing nutrients to be discharged into the river, which already suffered
from reverse flow and stagnation.197 To examine this more fully, the
Court first turned to the environmental impact assessment that was per-
formed for the mills.' 98 The Court concluded that the situating of the
mills at Fray Bentos did not contribute to any violation because CARU
performed the impact test and must have considered all of the discharge
that would occur before it gave its environmental approval.199 Argentina
also claimed that no proper consultation of its citizens took place during
the environmental assessment of the pulp mills, but the Court found oth-
erwise, stating that Uruguay consulted all of the affected parties
properly.200
The Court then moved on to the question of technology used in the
Botnia mill, finding that the mill did not exceed any of the environmental
limits set out by Uruguayan law or any overseeing environmental organi-
zation.201 Argentina's inability to prove that any of the pollution stan-
dards set out by the 1975 Statute or that any other laws were violated
shows that there was speculation as to the pollution, but no real proof.
They certainly should have made sure that pollution had or would have
taken place before bringing the case to the ICJ.
In the final section of its opinion, the Court turned to the impact of the
discharges made by the Botnia mill on the quality of the waters in the
river.202 In its assessment, the Court addressed all of the various sub-
stances Argentina claims damaged the river, including dissolved oxygen,
phosphorus, and other various substances.203 The Court found no clear
evidence that any of these substances were linked directly to the Botnia
mill. 204
With no finding of any substantive breach, the Court concluded its
findings by suggesting that ongoing monitoring of the Botnia mill take
place by CARU and that both countries attempt to cooperate to ensure
that the mills have as little effect on the river as possible. 205 With a final
ruling on both the procedural and substantive issues, the ICJ finally laid
195. April Judgment, supra note 1, 1 181, 189.
196. 1975 Statute, supra note 7, art. 41.
197. April Judgment, supra note 1, 191.
198. See id. 1 203-06.
199. Id. 214.
200. Id. T 219.
201. See id. 220-28.
202. See id. 9229-37.
203. Id. at 68-70.
204. Id. $$ 239, 250, 254, 257, 259.
205. See id. 266.
PROTESTING PULP
the case to rest. The Court never budged on its suggestion that the coun-
tries work out their issues directly.
From the outset, the Court clearly saw that both Argentina and Uru-
guay needed to resolve this between themselves. Neither country would
oblige. Although Argentina won on the procedural issues, the Court
found no harm because there was no substantive breach of the 1975 Stat-
ute. Overall, it was a victory for Uruguay because they could continue
promoting their pulp mills along the river. But Argentina did not open
the bridge for another five months. This goes to show that even after
waiting five years for a decision from the ICJ, the matter is not really
resolved. The Court can issue an opinion, but it cannot repair the dam-
age that years of tension have inflicted upon the neighboring countries'
relationship.
VIII. HOW DOES THE ICJ ENFORCE DECISIONS?
Now that the ICJ has delivered its final judgment, this article will next
discuss what has happened since. Although the Court ruled in favor of
Uruguay, little has happened in terms of the protests by Argentinean citi-
zens on the Fray Bentos bridge. To begin an assessment of the remedies
that can and should be taken by Uruguay and Argentina, it is beneficial
to examine how the ICJ typically enforces its decisions.
The first place to look to for enforcement of ICJ decisions is the UN
Security Council. 206 Under Article 94(2) of the U.N. Charter, the Secur-
ity Council is vested with the authority to give effect to judgment of the
ICJ.2 0 7 But, a problem quickly arises from the language of the Charter
giving the Security Council this power.20 8 The Council has discretionary
authority in enforcement; accordingly they may or may not decide to en-
force the decision of the ICJ.2 0 9 The provision gives the Security Council
"liberty not to act to enforce the decision, even if so requested by the
party in favour of which the decision has been rendered." 210 This seems
to be consistent with other provisions of the UN Charter, which essen-
tially give supreme power to the five permanent members of the Security
Council. 211 The problem with this method of enforcement is that it leaves
the final decision not to the Court, but rather to a political body.
If the party who loses the case in the ICJ fails to follow the ruling, then
the winning party must depend on the international community to en-
force the judgment.212 This could also include utilizing domestic courts
206. Attila Tanzi, Problems of Enforcement of Decisions of the International Court of
Justice and the Law of the United Nations, 6 Euiz. J. INr'I.. L. 539 (1995), available
at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/6/1/1311.pdf.
207. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2.
208. Tanzi, supra note 206, at 540-42.
209. Id. at 540-41.
210. Id. at 541-42.
211. See, e.g., U.N. Charter, art 24, para. 1.
212. Laura McGinnis, Enforcement of Decisions of the International Bodies: ICI and
WTO, JOiURNAL OF IN-riNAnIONAL Siiavisi (Sept. 16, 2009), available at http://
journalofinternationalservice.org/?p=31.
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for enforcement. 213 As one scholar notes:
Domestic litigation is especially effective where the international
commitment and the domestic law are closely aligned. Furthermore,
if the judgment of the ICJ reflects the domestic laws and policies of a
defendant country, that country is more likely to comply. In either
tribunal, the winning party must file a motion to compel
compliance.214
As this case clearly shows, the domestic laws of either country do not
deal with the situation that has arisen between Argentina and Uruguay.
So what would be the best means for enforcing such types of interna-
tional decisions between countries? Some have suggested that domestic
courts must find a way to incorporate international law into their dock-
ets. 2 1 5 Many have also suggested letting heads of state deal with the is-
sues. Neither of these ideas seems to have been very helpful in the
present case.216 In order to dig deeper into the issue of enforcing the
ICJ's decision to allow Uruguay to keep its mills, it would be helpful to
examine environmental agreements between countries generally to see
how countries generally deal with international environmental issues.
IX. ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
COUNTRIES: ENFORCEMENT OF THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL
Many studies have shown just how difficult it is to get countries to par-
ticipate in environmental agreements. 217 When thinking about typical
environmental agreements, one envisions something like the "tragedy of
the commons"-what is good for the whole is not necessarily good for the
individual.218 There have been numerous studies on why participation in
environmental agreements is unlikely in countries that focus on maximiz-
ing production and profits.219 So, how should environmental agreements
like the one between Uruguay and Argentina be enforced?
One of the most well-known international environmental agreements
today is the Kyoto Protocol (hereinafter "Protocol"). 220 The Protocol
deals with many issues of environmental pollution and has various re-
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Dia-
logue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 490 (2005).
216. See generally Jose Elosegui, Controversial Pulping Industry Expands, LATIN
AMERICA PRESs, Feb. 10, 2011, http://lapress.org/articles.aspart=6305.
217. See, e.g., Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, Incentives to Participate in an Interna-
tional Environmental Agreement, 9 ENVrL. & RESOURCE ECON. 153, 165-67
(1997).
218. M.S., The Irony of the Tragedy of the Commons, THE ECONOMisTi, Feb. 24, 2011,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/02/environmental
regulation.
219. See, e.g., Hoel & Schneider, supra note 217, at 165-67.
220. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
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quirements for different countries depending on their size, production,
wealth, etc.2 2 1 In order to enforce the agreement, the member countries
agreed to rely on a Compliance Committee that decides issues of non-
compliance brought to the Committee's attention by a member of the
Protocol. 222 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change describes the Compliance Committee as follows:
The Compliance Committee is made up of two branches: a facilitative
branch and an enforcement branch. As their names suggest, the facilita-
tive branch aims to provide advice and assistance to Parties in order to
promote compliance, whereas the enforcement branch has the responsi-
bility to determine consequences for Parties not meeting their commit-
ments. Both branches are composed of 10 members, including one
representative from each of the five official UN regions (Africa, Asia,
Latin America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, and
Western Europe and Others), one from the small island developing
States, and two each from Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. The Com-
mittee also meets in a plenary composed of members of both branches,
and a bureau, made up of the chairperson and vice-chairperson of each
branch, supports its work. Decisions of the plenary and the facilitative
branch may be taken by a three-quarters majority, while decisions of the
enforcement branch require, in addition, a double majority of both An-
nex I and non-Annex I Parties.223
In the end, this kind of enforcement does very little to hold countries
responsible for following the Protocol, and many countries have not held
up their end of the deal when it comes to pollution. 2 2 4 So, how do other
countries hold a violating country's feet to the fire? The first step would
be to attempt enforcement through the appropriate governing body. In
the case of a violation of the Kyoto Protocol, the violator would be
brought before the Compliance Committee.225
In the case of the 1975 Statute between Argentina and Uruguay, the
ICJ would first adjudicate the disagreement, but then where are the two
countries left? Countries often turn to economic sanctions to punish the
violating nation in order to compel compliance with international trea-
ties. When Argentina did not win in the ICJ, Argentina decided to sim-
ply not comply with the ICJ ruling. Environmental groups continued to
221. See generally Jutta Brunnee, A Fine Balance: Facilitation and Enforcement in the
Design of a Compliance Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13 Ti. ENVn.. L.J. 223,
247-48, 254-55 (2000); see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 220.
222. See Brunee, supra note 221, at 260-66.
223. An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Mechanism, Tiun UNrrino NA-
IONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATI Ci ANOI, http://unfccc.int/ky-
oto protocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
224. Press Release, Ecojustice, Canada Violating Kyoto Law: Environmental Groups
Challenge Federal Government on Failure to Act on Climate Law (Oct. 15, 2009),
available at http://www.ecojustice.ca/media-centre/press-releases/canada-violating-
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225. Geir Ulfstein & Jacob Werksman, The Kyoto Compliance System: Towards Hard
Enforcement, in, IMPL:MiNTN(i Tifl CuIMATE RiOimj: INmFRNATIONA COMPI-
AN( i 41, available at http://folk.uio.no/geiru/FheKyotoComplianceSystem.pdf.
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blockade the bridge with little or no interference from the Argentinean
government. The next section of this paper will evaluate what options
Uruguay has to ensure that Argentina complies with the ICJ's opinion in
the future, especially now that other foreign companies are planning to
build more pulp mills along the river.
X. THE CURRENT STATUS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND
URUGUAY AND SUGGESTIONS MOVING FORWARD
As of the end of 2010 and into the beginning of 2011, the Fray Bentos
bridge is open, and there is movement between Argentina and Uru-
guay.2 2 6 There is still, however, much tension between the two countries.
For one, there are plans for more pulp mills in Uruguay's future. 227 Al-
though it seems that the environmental groups have at least partially sur-
rendered, there is still an atmosphere of tension over the matter.
Following the opening of the bridge, both countries have seen dramatic
increases in tourism as compared to the five years that the bridge was
closed. 228
So where do the countries go from here? It is important that Uruguay
focus on keeping Argentina from blockading the connection between the
two countries by continuing to address concerns of pollution. Uruguay
should continue to ensure that measures are taken to prevent its pulp
mills from damaging the river. They should continue to abide by the 1975
Statute and, should disputes arise, attempt to work things out in a way
that will minimize disturbance of tourism and trade between the two
countries.
The removal of the blockade is likely to be temporary because of the
rising tension over new pulp mills planned along the river in Uruguay.
Uruguay is concerned with the positive impact pulp mills have had thus
far on its economy, so they are likely to continue to allow the growth and
expansion of paper mills along the river. It is crucial that they continue to
heavily monitor these mills to ensure that pollution levels are kept at bay.
Uruguay's environmental agencies should make sure that these compa-
nies do not disturb the River in a way that will negatively impact
Argentina.
Uruguay needs to properly tax these mills in a way that will allow the
Uruguayan government to monitor pollution on the river. This tax does
not need to be so high that it prevents companies from wanting to pro-
duce in Uruguay-it just needs to cover some or all of the costs for the
Uruguayan government to monitor pollution levels in the river. This may
seem like an extreme solution, but considering the number of pulp mills
226. Tourist Influx to Uruguay in January Soars to 40%, M7RCO PRLss, Feb. 11, 2011,
http://en.mercopress.com/2011/02/1 1/tourist-influx-to-uruguay-during-january-
soars-40.
227. See id.; Elosegui, supra note 216.
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being built along the River Uruguay, it would be a smart way of protect-
ing the river for both Uruguay and Argentina.
Additionally, Uruguay needs to ensure that sanctions are in place for
those mills that violate the pollution standards set forth in both interna-
tional and domestic laws. In particular, criminal sanctions are a popular
remedy for enforcing environmental standards on corporations. 2 2 9 Al-
though there are inherent limits to what criminal sanctions can accom-
plish, they can be effective. 230 The basis for these sanctions is the ability
of a society to "internalize environmental values." 231 Once the cost of
environmental protection is internalized, it becomes much easier to see
how criminal sanctions are an effective means of deterrence.232 Susan
Hedman, Administrator for the EPA Region 5, describes how public per-
ception is key for the success of criminal sanctions in environmental law:
Publicity associated with the imposition of criminal sanctions in envi-
ronmental cases certainly can play a role in the process of educating
the business community and changing norms. Yet expanding the
criminal law potentially threatens democratic values. Perhaps the
trade-off between environmental values and democratic objectives
can be justified for cases like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince
William Sound, where criminal sanctions are selected because of
their unique capacity to convey moral outrage. However, if criminal
sanctions are used as an expedient means of public education-to fill
in where government has failed to live up to its civic educational
obligations-we have turned away from the New Environmental
Paradigm and started down Professor Heilbroner's slippery slope to
authoritarianism.233
Criminal sanctions would depend largely on the public perception in
Uruguay about the environment. The events leading up to this case cer-
tainly make it questionable whether Uruguay is very concerned with the
environment, but criminal sanctions should not be ruled out as a viable
method for making sure its companies do not pollute the River. Uruguay
has a strong interest in keeping peace with Argentina and sanctions
would certainly do much to assuage Argentina's fears about pollution
from the pulp mills.
Another option for Uruguay is to allow Argentina to monitor pollution
from the pulp mills. This is feasible because the countries share the river
where the monitoring would take place. This would greatly alleviate the
fears of environmental groups in Argentina. If Argentina discovers ab-
normal or potentially damaging pollution levels, they can notify the
proper authority in Uruguay and hopefully the matter can be resolved.
This should be done through the Commission set up by the statute as
229. See Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental
Law, 59 Gio. WASH. L. Rirv. 889, 894 (1991).
230. Id. at 894-95.
231. Id. at 898.
232. Id. at 894-95.
233. Id. at 898-99.
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well, but Argentina directly monitoring the pollution levels in the river
would likely remove doubts that Argentinean environmental groups have
about bias in the Commission. This would, of course, be costly to Argen-
tina, but it is certainly an option that it should consider to keep trade and
tourism between the two countries healthy.
After discussing the options for monitoring pollution of the pulp mills
going forward, this article turns to how the two countries should resolve
other disputes, should they arise. Resorting to the ICJ for adjudication
should be a last resort for Argentina and Uruguay. The last dispute
caused irreparable damage between the two countries, so both countries
should be determined to avoid a shutdown of the bridge for any period of
time. In order to do that, both countries must be willing to compromise.
Uruguay must be willing to give Argentina's concerns the proper atten-
tion they deserve and Argentina must be willing to recognize Uruguay's
efforts for conciliation and need to find and equilibrium between growing
its economy and protecting its environment.
Argentina must realize that Uruguay has a strong interest in allowing
these mills to incorporate along the river, as pulp mills were responsible
for a major portion of Uruguay's growth in the past few years.234 Perhaps
Argentina can take a lesson from Uruguay and receive a boost to its
economy by allowing companies to build on their side of the River as
well.
If another dispute should arise, Argentina should try diligently to re-
solve the issue with Uruguay. If Uruguay refuses to comply or consider
the needs of Argentina, Argentina should threaten trade between the
countries and discourage tourism. After the damage done by the last dis-
pute, Uruguay would be smart not to do further damage to the trade and
tourism between the two countries. Uruguay and Argentina, as neigh-
boring countries, have an interdependent relationship that both countries
should recognize and respect. Argentina should not have to simply sit
quietly if it truly believes Uruguay is damaging a major natural resource
that is shared by the two countries. They should take action when Uru-
guay is threatening to damage the river, but they should be careful to
take action in a way that does not threaten to damage the relationship
with their neighboring country.
Both countries must be cautious about how they handle their relation-
ship. Uruguay and Argentina can both take actions that will greatly dam-
age the other, but care should be given because damage will likely
happen to both countries when these measures are taken. To be sure,
Argentina can block the bridge, as it did in this situation. The problem is
that Argentina also hurt itself by blocking the bridge, and the blockade
did not impact Uruguay enough to halt the construction of the mills per-
manently, so there must be a better solution for both parties.
234. Patricia Avila, Uruguay Growth Soars 13 Pct. as Paper Mill Starts Up, REUTERS,
Sept. 13, 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/2008/09/12/uruguay-economy-growth-
idINN1251503920080912.
PROTESTING PULP
Although the verdict of the ICJ was welcomed by both parties, most of
the joy probably came from the fact that both countries just wanted the
dispute to be over with so they could try and start with a fresh relation-
ship.2 3 5 What both countries need to be concerned with from here on is
preventing the dispute from arising again. Although they ultimately won
the case, Uruguay must not ignore the concerns of Argentina. The ICJ
explicitly pointed to violations in procedure that Uruguay made and Uru-
guay must be careful not to make those same mistakes again. Not only
could they face a major rift in their relationship with Argentina, but
should Argentina bring additional charges to the ICJ, they could face se-
vere penalties the next time around.
When looking at the methods of enforcing the ICJ's decision, it be-
comes clear that there is no real way to enforce it. The legitimacy of the
Court comes from a mutual understanding and respect of the countries
involved to follow the decisions of the Court. By not immediately remov-
ing the blockades from the bridge leading to Fray Bentos, Argentina un-
dermined the authority of the ICJ. When a country does this, it chips
away at the power of the Court. This must be avoided if Argentina
wishes to rely upon the protections the court can provide in international
disputes. This issue highlights the tension between international law and
state sovereignty. One the one hand, countries want protection from be-
ing wronged by other countries, but, on the other hand, they are very
reluctant to give up their right as a country to act as they wish. Interna-
tional laws cannot work when a state refuses to relinquish any portion of
their sovereignty.
Although international bodies such as the ICJ can work well as a last
resort to resolving disputes between countries, even the ICJ itself prefers
direct resolution. 236 Direct resolution should have been accomplished in
this case. The dispute did not rise to the level of needing to be adjudi-
cated by the ICJ, which took over five years. Full-fledged wars have
taken less time. Without a willingness to resolve disputes directly, Argen-
tina and Uruguay set a poor standard for resolving disputes that arise in
the future. Both countries must recognize that in order to move forward,
concessions must be made and each country must make a meaningful ef-
fort to address any concerns of the other.
By taking the issue to the JCJ, Argentina and Uruguay undermined the
purpose of the 1975 Statute. The Statute was created to set forth the
procedures for dealing with issues regarding the River Uruguay-the
very issue that caused this dispute in the first place. By not following the
Statute, Uruguay undermined the relationship between the two countries.
By not following the decision of the ICJ, Argentina undermined the au-
thority of the ICJ. Both countries share the blame for what happened
235. Jude Webber, Pulp Mill Frays Argentine-Uruguay Relations, FINANCIAL TIMlis,
Apr. 20, 2010, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/1el4668e-4ca6-11df-9977-00
144feab49a.html#axzzlFFhK65UD.
236. See generally Bekker, supra note 123.
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and both countries are at fault. Now, it is up to both Argentina and Uru-
guay to make sure that they can resolve disputes directly, in a way that
does as little damage as possible to their relationship-a relationship that
will continue to remain important due to their proximity to one another.
Moving forward, Argentina and Uruguay must take great pains to re-
pair their relationship and certainly not do further damage. This will re-
quire effort on both sides. Both countries must be sure to develop
foreign relations in a way that encourages swift resolution rather than
resulting in fissures that grow deeper over time. In order to accomplish
this goal, they must be able to recognize the mutual benefit received
when they are able to resolve their issues in an amicable fashion.
XI. CONCLUSION
Has the decision from the ICJ resolved anything? An analysis of the
events since the ruling leaves one asking that question. The answer: it
depends on what you mean by "resolved." Sure, the Court said that Uru-
guay was fine in building the Pulp Mills, but Argentina did not remove
the blockades from the Fray Bentos bridge. Neither side won and very
little was actually resolved.
When Argentina brought the case before the ICJ in 2006, it had done
little to resolve the issue with Uruguay directly. The countries met very
few times to discuss the pulp mills that were planned to be built in Uru-
guay. By failing to work together, both Uruguay and Argentina failed an
important test of their foreign relations. The ICJ should be a last resort,
but it seems that both countries viewed it as a first resort. This decision
was detrimental to their foreign relations as well as trade and tourism
between the countries.
Whether Argentina and Uruguay learned from their mistakes will
likely be revealed in the near future as more industrial activity develops
along the River Uruguay. Moving forward, it is imperative that both
countries recognize the need to work together to reconcile their goals as
much as possible. When they are able to do so without an escalation in
tension and deterioration in their relationship as happened in this case,
they will be able to move forward in a way that is beneficial to both
countries.
Had there been the mutual respect necessary to resolve the paper mill
dispute directly, both Argentina and Uruguay could have avoided the
long, drawn out battle that led to no real resolution. Argentina and Uru-
guay must learn from this situation and move forward with more respect
and consideration for the concerns of one another.
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